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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REVIEW 
Desiree Eliasen submits the following in support of her Petition for Review. 
A. Why Review Should be Granted 
This Court should grant review pursuant to I.A.R. 118(b )(1) because the Court of Appeals 
has decided a question of substance not heretofore determined by this Court. Specifically, it has 
held in a published opinion that the stalking statute's requirement that the defendant commit a 
"course of conduct" by engaging in "repeated acts of nonconsensual contact" can be satisfied by 
evidence that the defendant committed one continuous act of nonconsensual contact, in a case 
where the nature of the nonconsensual contact changed from appearing to following to 
surveilling and then back to following all without a break in contact. This Court has never 
interpreted the meaning of the phrase "repeated acts of nonconsensual contact" as used in I.C. § 
l 8-7906(2)(a). It should accept review to do so now. 
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B. Statement of Facts 
Desiree was charged by citation with one count of Second-Degree Stalking in violation of 
LC. § 18-7906. R 96. The state alleged that: 
On or about 26 September 2008, in the City of Pocatello, State ofldaho, the 
Defendant, DESIREE ELAISEN, knowingly and maliciously engaged in a course 
of conduct that seriously annoyed, alarmed or harassed Lynette Sampson causing 
her to suffer substantial emotional distress by following and/or maintaining 
surveillance upon Lynette Sampson. 
R 160. She entered a plea of not guilty. R 105. 
At trial, Lynette Sampson testified that she lives at 454 Wyldwood Lane in Pocatello. 
She is married to Pocatello Police Officer Richard Sampson and they have two young children. 
T pg. 176, In. 10-20. On Friday, September 26, 2008, she was planning to go to the Goodwill 
Store to make a donation and then go to the Fred Meyer store to shop. T pg. 177, In. 4-5. At 
about 12:45 p.m., she and her three-year-old daughter left the house. Id, In. 8 -12. As she was 
backing out of the garage and driveway, she noticed a brown Blazer stopped in the roadway 
facing east. T pg. 178, In. 22-25. She waited a few seconds for the Blazer to move. When it 
didn't move, she backed onto the road and drove west. T pg. 179, In. 1-2. The Blazer headed 
east, did a U-tum and then headed west. T pg. 180, In. 1-3. Ms. Sampson drove a block and 
one-half east on Wyldwood, turned south on Meadowbrook, traveled a short block, then turned 
right onto E. Alameda heading west toward Yellowstone Ave. She did not notice where the 
Blazer was at this point. Id., In. 9-24. 
Alameda and Yellowstone are both major arterials in Pocatello. Ms. Sampson drove west 
on Alameda for three blocks and stopped for a red light at Yellowstone. She was in the left tum 
lane and the Blazer was right behind her. T pg. 181, ln. 5-18. 
Ms. Sampson then turned left and drove to the Goodwill Store at 441 Yellowstone Ave., 
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about one-half of a mile from the intersection. She did not notice the Blazer behind her. T pg. 
181, ln. 5-13. When she pulled into the Goodwill, she noticed the Blazer "turned sharply" into 
the parking lot and then park. Ms. Sampson got out of her car, got some bags out of the trunk, 
and started walking to the donation door. A Goodwill employee came out to help her with the 
donations and she stood by the door while the employee took the bags inside. While she was 
waiting, she saw the Blazer. T pg. 182, In. 5 - pg. 183, In. 4. Ms. Sampson identified Ms. 
Eliasen as the driver of the Blazer. T pg. 183, In. 18 - pg. 184, In. 2. At that time she did not 
know Ms. Eliasen. T pg. 176, In. 25 - pg. 177, In. 1. Ms. Sampson left the Goodwill the back 
way, and turned right on Pine St. This route is safer than taking a left onto Yellowstone because 
there is a traffic signal at Pine. The Blazer was behind her at the red light at Pine and 
Yellowstone. She then turned north onto Yellowstone heading toward the Fred Meyer as did the 
Blazer. Ms. Sampson turned right on Cedar St., which is located a long block north of Pine, 
without signaling. T pg. 184, In. 10 - pg. 185, In. 23. The Blazer also turned right. TT pg. 186, 
In. 1 - pg. 187, In. 1. 
Ms. Sampson then called her husband, but was not able to reach him. She called again 
while driving eastbound on Cedar and, after speaking to him, decided to drive to the police 
station. T pg. 187, In. 11-18. She turned right from Cedar onto Jefferson Ave., right again from 
Jefferson onto Oak, and left onto Sherman where the police station is located. T pg. 188, In. 4-
22. Both Jefferson and Oak are main thoroughfares in Pocatello. The Blazer was between two to 
four cars behind Ms. Sampson as she drove down Jefferson and Oak. The Blazer continued 
down Oak Street and did not tum down Sherman. T pg. 189, In. 15 - pg. 65, In. 5. 
Officer Sampson testified that his wife aITived at the police station and told him the 
license plate number of the Blazer. T pg. 206, In. 16. He testified that Ms. Eliasen's "name came 
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back" when he "r[an] that license plate." T pg. 220, In. 18 - pg. 221, In. 1. 
The jury found Ms. Eliasen guilty. R 270. 
C. The Evidence is Insufficient to Show a Course of Conduct Consisting of Repeated Acts 
of Non-Consensual Contact 
Ms. Eliasen's right to due process has been violated because the state's evidence, even 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is insufficient for any rational trier of 
fact to have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358,364 (1970); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,316 (1979). 
The state charged Ms. Eliasen with that portion of the statute which provides that "[ a] 
person commits the crime of stalking in the second degree if the person knowingly and 
maliciously ... [ e ]ngages in a course of conduct that seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the 
victim and is such as would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress." R 160. 
The statute defines the term "course of conduct" to mean "repeated acts of nonconsensual 
contact." LC.§ 19-7906(2)(a) (emphasis added). Examples of"[n]onconsensual contact" under 
section 2(c) include appearing at the residence of the victim, as well as "[f]ollowing the victim 
or maintaining surveillance[.]" 
Here, the evidence was insufficient because there was only a single occurrence of non-
consensual contact between Ms. Eliasen and Ms. Sampson. And a single occurrence of 
nonconsensual contact cannot constitute a "course of conduct" under J.C.§ 19-7906(1)(a). 
While there is no Supreme Court opinion addressing this issue, the principles of statutory 
interpretation require that conclusion. As this Court has said, 
the objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the legislative 
body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language 
of the statute. Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in 
the context of the entire document. The statute should be considered as a whole, 
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and words should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be 
noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute 
so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language 
is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given 
effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory construction. 
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866-67, 264 P.3d 970, 973-74 (2011). 
While the plain language of the statute requires "repeated acts" of nonconsensual contact, 
all the evidence shows, even when taken in the light most favorable to the state, is that Ms. 
Eliasen drove to Wyldwood Lane and followed Ms. Sampson until Ms. Sampson turned off of 
Oak Street onto Sherman Street, stopping only for traffic signals and when Ms. Sampson paused 
at the Goodwill. That is a single instance of nonconsensual contact. 
The district court, without citation to supporting authority, was of the "view that a change 
in the nature of the conduct that a defendant engages in creates a sufficient break in the events to 
demonstrate a course of conduct through repeated acts of nonconsensual contact with a victim." 
R 76. And the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court finding that "[t]here is substantial and 
competent evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Eliasen's actions constituted a 
course of conduct .... Eliasen committed a nonconsensual contact by appearing at the victim's 
residence and another when she conducted a U-tum and followed the victim." Exhibit A, pg. 4. 
(A copy of the Court of Appeals's published opinion is attached hereto as Exhibit A.) 
However, the Court of Appeals's conclusion is contrary to the plain language of the 
statute, which does not require multiple instances of prohibited conduct. It requires "repeated 
acts ofnonconsensual contact." LC.§ 18-7906(2)(a). There is only one act of"nonconsensual 
contact" here even if there was prohibited conduct by waiting at Wyldwood Lane, following to 
Goodwill, waiting there and then continuing the following. The nonconsensual contact between 
Ms. Eliasen and Ms. Sampson began at Wyldwood Lane and did not end until Ms. Sampson 
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turned off Oak Street onto Sherman Street. While the nature of the nonconsensual contact 
changed, there was still only one uninterrupted contact. 
The natural reading of the statute is that there can only be a new act of "nonconsensual 
contact" when there is some break in the original "nonconsensual contact." Without such a 
break, there cannot be "repeated acts of nonconsensual contact," as required by the statute. Here, 
there was no break in the contact. Desiree drove to Wyldwood Street, began the contact when 
she followed Ms. Sampson to Goodwill, paused when Ms. Sampson shortly paused and then 
continued following when Ms. Sampson resumed, all without breaking off the nonconsensual 
contact at anytime. According to Ms. Sampson, there was no time that Desiree left the 
immediate area nor did Desiree break off contact from the time Ms. Sampson left her home on 
Wyldwood until they parted ways when Ms. Sampson turned off Oak Street onto Sherman. Only 
one instance of nonconsensual contact occurred. 
The district court cited to two Washington State cases, both interpreting the Washington 
State stalking statute. Revised Code of Washington§ 9A.46.110(1)(a) prohibits "intentionally 
and repeatedly harassing or repeatedly following another person." R 76-77. The Washington 
Supreme Court has written in this regard, "As we have observed, 'repeatedly' is defined as 'on 
two or more separate occasions,' meaning district, individual, noncontinuance occurrences or 
incidents." State v. Kintz, 238 P.3d 470,477 (Wash. 2010). Thus, Ms. Eliasen did not 
repeatedly engage in acts of nonconsensual conduct under Kintz 's definition of "repeatedly," as 
there was only one contact. Accord, City of Seattle v. Meah, 297 P.3d 69, 72 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2011) (Evidence of "separate occasions" insufficient where defendant attempted to talk to 
complaining witness on bus, continued when he followed her off the bus and up the street and 
ended when a third party intervened. "Because no reasonable jury could find that Meah's 
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conduct constituted more than a single, continuous episode of following, the evidence introduced 
at Meah's trial was insufficient to support Meah's stalking conviction based on two or more 
separate occasions of following.") 
Contrary to the Washington Court's common sense understanding of the word 
"repeatedly," the Court of Appeals's interpretation of "repeated acts" here is contrary to the plain 
language of the statute. It would lead to the absurd result that the behavior of the complaining 
witness determines whether there is a single occurrence of contact or multiple instances (and thus 
criminal liability) simply by pausing or changing directions while being followed. Under the 
Court of Appeal's interpretation of the statute, conviction would be permitted if Ms. Sampson 
was driving South, stopped at a stop sign, then turned West, if Desiree followed the same route. 
These results are plainly not what the Legislature meant by "repeated acts of nonconsensual 
contact" and the Court of Appeals's interpretation which leads to those results should be rejected. 
State v. Schulz, supra; see also State v. Harvey, 142 Idaho 727, 730, 132 P.3d 1255, 1258 (Ct. 
App. 2006) ( constructions of a statute which leads to an absurd result are disfavored); see also 
State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103, 175 P.3d 788, 792 (2008) ("[T]he rule oflenity states that 
criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of defendants."). 
D. Conclusion 
This Court should take this opportunity to determine the meaning of "repeated acts" in 
the statute. Under the correct understanding of that phrase, the evidence here does not show 
there was a course of conduct as required by statute. Therefore, this Court should grant review, 
vacate the conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal because there was not substantial and 
competent evidence to support the verdict. Jackson v. Virginia, supra; In re Winship, supra; 
State v. Hollon, 136 Idaho 499,501, 36 P.3d 1287, 1289 (Ct. App. 2001). 
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1c..'11" 
Respectfully submitted thi~ __ day of August, 2014. 
LJ_.q,v,~ !5 ~<-------
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Desiree Eliasen 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this2~'1:;of August, 2014, I caused a true and correct 






Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
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Dennis Benjamin 
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Docket No. 41428 
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2014 Opinion No. 57 
Filed: July 24, 2014 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
________________ ) 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Bannock County. Hon. Stephen S. Dunn, District Judge. Hon. Rick Carnaroli, 
Magistrate. 
Intermediate appellate decision of the district court affirming magistrate's 
judgment of conviction for second degree stalking, affirmed. 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP; Dennis Benjamin, Boise, for appellant. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
GRATTON, Judge 
Desiree B. Eliasen appeals from the decision of the district court in its appellate capacity 
affirming the magistrate's judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding her guilty of second 
degree stalking, Idaho Code § 18-7906. She claims there was insufficient evidence to support 
her conviction. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Eliasen was charged with one count of second degree stalking. The victim is the wife of 
a police officer and they have two young children. As the victim and her three-year-old daughter 
left their residence to run errands, she noticed a brown Chevy Blazer stopped on the road across 
from her home. After waiting for the Blazer to proceed down the street, which it ultimately did 
not, the victim backed out of her driveway. The Blazer then made a U-turn and followed her to 
the Goodwill store, which entailed traveling several blocks and making four turns. The victim 
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exited her vehicle at the Goodwill store and carried her donations to the door. She then 
proceeded to exit the parking lot and when she stopped at a traffic light, she became concerned 
the Blazer was still following her. When the light changed, the victim turned and the Blazer 
followed her. Instead of proceeding to Fred Meyer, she made another tum and the Blazer 
continued to follow her. 
The victim became frightened and tried to reach her husband. Her first call was 
unsuccessful, but she was able to reach him on her second phone call and they decided she 
should go to the police station to meet him. It was not until the victim turned in front of the 
police station that the Blazer stopped following her and continued to go straight. The victim 
reported the license plate number. 
After being charged with second degree stalking, Eliasen filed a motion to dismiss, 
arguing she had only followed the victim on one occasion and that the statute requires a "course 
of conduct" as an essential element. The magistrate court denied the motion, holding that the 
police report could be interpreted as demonstrating two separate events, distinguished by the 
victim stopping at the Goodwill store. Thereafter, the State filed a complaint and Eliasen filed a 
renewed motion to dismiss, which was also denied. 
At trial, Eliasen unsuccessfully moved for a judgment of acquittal. A jury convicted 
Eliasen of second degree stalking. Eliasen appealed to the district court. The only issue she 
pursued on appeal was whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove the material 
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court found the magistrate's 
ruling was supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. The district court 
upheld the jury verdict and affirmed the judgment of the magistrate. 




When reviewing the decision of a district court sitting m its appellate capacity, our 
standard ofreview is the same as expressed by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine 
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's 
findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from 
those findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow 
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therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. 
Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 858-59, 303 P.3d 214, 217-18 (2013) (quoting Bailey v. Bailey, 
153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012)). Thus, the appellate courts do not review the 
decision of the magistrate court. Bailey, 153 Idaho at 529, 284 P.3d at 973. Rather, we are 
procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court. State v. Korn, 148 
Idaho 413,415 n.1, 224 P.3d 480,482 n.1 (2009). 
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A finding of guilt 
will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable 
trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential 
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 
P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. 
App. 1991). We will not substitute our view for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility of the 
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
from the evidence. Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001; State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 
684, 701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct. App. 1985). Moreover, we will consider the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 
121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001. 
Under the applicable statute, a person "commits the crime of stalking in the second 
degree if the person knowingly and maliciously . . . [ e ]ngages in a course of conduct that 
seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the victim and is such as would cause a reasonable person 
substantial emotional distress." LC. § 18-7906(1)(a). Eliasen claims there is insufficient 
evidence to support her conviction. Specifically, she argues that the district court erred in 
finding there was sufficient evidence to conclude her behavior constituted a "course of conduct" 
as required by the statute. The statute defines "course of conduct" as "repeated acts of 
nonconsensual contact involving the victim or a family or household member of the victim, 
provided however, that constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of 
this definition" I.C. § 18-7906(2)(a). The statute further provides that "nonconsensual contact" 
includes, but is not limited to: 
(i) Following the victim or maintaining surveillance, including by 
electronic means, on the victim; 
(ii) Contacting the victim in a public place or on private property; 
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(iii) Appearing at the workplace or residence of the victim; 
(iv) Entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased or occupied by 
the victim; 
(v) Contacting the victim by telephone or causing the victim's telephone 
to ring repeatedly or continuously regardless of whether a conversation ensues; 
(vi) Sending mail or electronic communications to the victim; or 
(vii) Placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, 
leased or occupied by the victim. 
LC. § 18-7906(2)(c). Eliasen argues the district court's ruling is erroneous because while the 
type of prohibited contact may have changed, there was only a single occurrence of 
nonconsensual contact between her and the victim because there was no break in the contact. 
Therefore, she claims the evidence was insufficient to show "repeated acts of nonconsensual 
contact." The State argues the district court was correct because the statute does not require a 
break in contact, only that there be "repeated acts of nonconsensual contact." 
In finding that there were "repeated acts," the district court reasoned that Eliasen 
engaged in more than one of the types of prohibited contact: conducting surveillance of the 
victim, following the victim, and appearing at her residence. It found there were actually four 
specific instances of prohibited conduct: (1) appearing at the victim's residence; (2) following 
her to Goodwill; (3) conducting surveillance on the victim while she was at Goodwill; and 
(4) following her from Goodwill to the police station. 
Eliasen argues the district court's analysis converting a change in the nature of the 
contact into separate instances of contact is contrary to the plain language of the statute. Eliasen 
asserts there cannot be "repeated acts of non consensual contact" because there can only be a new 
act if there is a break in the original contact. She cites State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 175 P.3d 
788 (2008), for the position that "[t]he rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be strictly 
construed in favor of defendants." Id. at 103, 175 P.3d at 792. However, where the language of 
a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without 
engaging in statutory construction. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. 
App. 2003). 
There is substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the conclusion that 
Eliasen's actions constituted a course of conduct, and that in this case, there arc "repeated acts of 
nonconscnsual contact." We need not determine whether Eliasen's conduct constituted more 
than two instances of nonconsensual contact. Eliasen committed a nonconsensual contact by 
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appearing at the victim's residence and another when she conducted a U-tum and followed the 
victim. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to support her conviction. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
There is sufficient evidence to support Eliasen's conviction for second degree stalking. 
Therefore, we affirm the district court's appellate decision affirming the magistrate's judgment 
of conviction and sentence. 
Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge LANSING CONCUR. 
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